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CmsoRSBIP-The New York Court of Appeals upheld the denial of
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a license to exhibit the French motion picture "La Ronde'' upon the grounds
that it was "immoral'' and "would tend to corrupt morals."1 Censorship of the
picture, which dealt with promiscuous sex relations, was held to be a proper
exercise of the police power, since its exhibition would present a clear and
present danger to the morals of the community, and the words "immoral" and
"tend to corrupt morals" were held sufficiently definite for purposes of due
process. In another censorship case, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed
the rejection for exhibition of the motion picture ''M," a film giving sympathetic
treatment to a schizophrenic child ldller, on the ground the picture was "harmful," and held the word "harmful" was neither vague nor indefurlte.2 On appeal
of the two cases to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed per
curlam,3 Burstyn 11. Wilson4 being cited as authority ·without further discussion.

Superior Fil11zs, Inc. 11. Department of- Education of- State of- Ohio, Commercial
Pictures Corporation v. Regents of University of State of Ne11J York, (U.S.
1954) 74 S.Ct. 286.
A curious anomaly in the field of constitutional law was finally rectified
in the recent Supreme Court movie censorship case of Burstyn v. Wilson, and
now courts are seeking to determine the extent of that holding. The Court
decided in 1915 in Mutual Film Corp. 11. Industrial Co1n1nission5 that motion
picture exhibition was purely a commercial spectacle, not a part of the press
or a medium of public opinion, and therefore the censors'hip of movies did not
give rise to a constitutional issue under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

1 Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents of UniveISily of State of New York,
(N.Y. 1953) 113 N.E. (2d) 502. The New York Education Law requires that a license
to exhibit a molion picture be granted "unless such film or a part thereof is obscene, indecent, :immoral, inhuman, sacrllegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend
to corrupt morals or incite to crime. •••" 16 N.Y. Consol Laws (McKinney, 1953) §122.
2 Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, 159 Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E. (2d;
311 (1953). The Ohio censorship law provides that a license shall be given to exhibit only
those films which are "of a moral, educational or amusing and ha:anless character." Ohio
Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §3305,04.

s Justices Black and Douglas concuxred in a separate opinion.
U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777 (1952).
U.S. 230, 35 S.Ct. 387 (1915). See also Mutual Film Corp. v. Hodges, 236
U.S. 248, 35 S.Ct. 393 (1915); Fox Film Corp. v. Trumbull, (2d Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d)
715; Block v. Chicago, 239
251, 87 N.E. 1011 (1909). It was also held that newsreels are not part of the press and are subject to censorship. Pathe Exchange v. Cobb, 236
N.Y. 539, 142 N.E. 274 (1923).
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• While at the time of the Mutual decision only three states6 had censorship laws,
that case was an impetus to the enactment of many such laws. Today, in
addition to various municipal ordinances, there are eight states7 having censorship laws and eleven others8 ·with statutes limiting the exhibition of motion
pictures in some way. The fust step9 in the transition from the rationale of
the Mutual case to that of the Burstyn case was taken in Gitlow 11. New Y ork,1'0
where the Court decided that the First Amendment freedoms are protected from
state encroachment by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Next, in Near 11. Minnesota,11 it was held that except in rare circumstances prior
restraints on freedom of the press or speech are unconstitutional. Encouraged
by this judicial climate and by some pregnant dictum,12 the motion picture
industry attempted to persuade the Court to reconsider its holding in the Mutual
case, at first without success.18 Then in the Burstyn case the Court finally
recognized the importance of the motion picture as an organ affecting public
opinion, and held that movies are to be included within the free speech and
press guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Although that case
had the desirable effect of overruling the out-dated reasoning of the Mutual
decision, it was not a clear-cut opinion on the constitutionality of motion picture
censorship. Justice Clark, writing for the majority in the Burstyn case, reasoned
that since motion pictures are part of the press and since the case did not present
such an exceptional situation as would justify the imposition of a prior restraint,
the censorship was unconstitutional.14 The concurring opinion argued that
6 Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §3305.04; Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. .Ann.
(Pmdon, 1930) tit. 4, §43; Kansas: Kan. Gen. Stat. (1949) §§51-101 to 51-112.
'l In addition to those cited in note 6 supra: Florida: Fla. Stat. (1951) §§521.01 to
521.04; Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 4, §§301 to 307; Maryland: Md. Code Ann.
(Flack, 1951) art. 66A, §6; New York: 16 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1953) §120;
Virginia: Va. Code (1950) §§2-98 to 2-116.
s Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §8580 as applied through §3702; Illinois:
ill. Rev. Stat. (ID. Bm: Assn., 1953) c. 38, §471; Iowa: Iowa Code .Ann. (1946) §725.3;
Massach11setts: Mass. Laws· Ann. (1949) c. 136, §§2 to 4; Montana: Mont. Rev. Code
.Ann. (1947) §94-3573; Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §28-1120; North Carolina: N.C.
Gen. Stat. (1950) §14-193; Texas: Tex. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1952) art. 527; Vermont:
Vt. Stat. (1947) §8492; West Virginia: W.Va. Code .Ann. (1949) §6109; Wisconsin:
Wis. Stat. (1951) §351.38(3). See also the fedetal statute prohibiting :importation of
obscene films, 18 U.S.C. (1946) §396, and hmmNA'rioNAL MonoN P.tcnmn ALM.AN.a.a
646-656 (1949), discussing the motion picture industry's sel£-:imposed regulations.
9 It should be noted that the Mutual case did not decide whether the Ohio censorship
statute violated the Fust Amendment as applied through the Fourteenth since the First
Amendment was not considered a restraint upon the states.
10 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925).
11283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931).
12Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in an antitrust proceeding, said, ''W~ have
no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose
freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment." United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334
U.S. 131 at 166, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948).
18 RD-DR Corporation v. Smith, (5th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 562, cert. den. 340
U.S. 853, 71 S.Ct. 80 (1950).
14 Burstyn v. Wilson, note 4 supra, at 781-782.
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censorship under the statute was a denial of due process because the statute15
was too vague and indefinite.16 It is clear that something more is needed to
guide the states in determining when they may constitutionally censor a motion
picture. The problem is made more acute in view of the intimation in the
Burstyn case that censorship of a picture on the grounds of obscenity would be
constitutional.17 Since the principal case now decides that censorship on the
basis of immorality is unconstitutional, the states are faced with the difficult
problem of distinguishing benveen these two terms. Apparently the Court is not
ready as yet to accord to motion pictures all the privileges of the press, as is
evidenced by the necessity for a concurring opinion in the present case by Justices
Black and Douglas advocating complete freedom from censorship. No indication
has been given, however, as to what test will be applied to determine the constitutionality of the censorship. The fact that a restraint on expression is under
consideration makes it possible that the "clear-and-present-danger" test will be
used to examine the propriety of the censorship, although that test has generally
been employed in testing the constitutionality of after-imposed sanctions on
expression18 rather than prior restraints. However, the constantly reiterated
theme that the main basis for censorship of motion pictures is their propensity
for evil among children,19 coupled with the fact that the clear-and-present-danger
test itself may have recently undergone some re6nement,20 would seem to indicate that a rule of reason may be the definitive test. Such a rule of reason could
take the form of a reasonable man test, allowing the censorship to stand only if
reasonable men would agree that the exhibition of the picture in question would
tend to promote the substantive evil that a state has the right to prevent, or it
could be less strict and uphold the censorship so long as the board of censors
appeared to have acted reasonably in the exercise of their discretion. Although
not brought out in the opinion, an interesting point allowing for some speculation on this general question is the fact that the Court made its own review of
the pictures involved in the principal case.21 This may mean that film censorlGThe Court was considering the word "sacrilegious" of the New York statute quoted
in note l supra.
10 Nor is Gelling v. Ta-as, 343 U.S. 960, 72 S.Ct. 1002 (1952), of much avail. The
majority opinion merely cited the Burstyn case as the basis for its decision, while one
concurring opinion was based on indefiniteness and the other stated only that the case
represented the evil of prior restraint in a most flagrant form.
17 Burstyn v. Wilson, note 4 supra, at 782.
18 Antieau, "The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of Its Applicability," 48
MxCH. L. RBv. 811 (1950).
10 CHAPEE, Frum SPEECH IN 'IRE UNIDID STATES 540-548 (1948).
2 0 Chief Justice Vinson, in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at 510, 71 S.Ct.
857 (1951), quoted from the appellate opinion by Judge Learned Hand: ''In each case
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil', discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessazy to avoid the danger." See Convin, "Bowing
Out of Clear and Present Danger," 27 Nol'RB DAllm LAWYER 325 (1952), where the
author states his belief that this language authorizes the court to weigh the substantive
good protected by a statute against the "clear-and-present-danger" requirement, thus making
the test a rule of reason.
21N.Y. Tll'>ms, Jan. 19, 1954, p. 1:6-7.
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ship will stand only if reasonable men would agree that e..-dtlbition of the picture
would tend to promote the substantive evil.22
Constantine D. Kasson, S.Ecl.

22 It would appear that the courts of Ohio and New York adopted the test that censorship is justified unless all reasonable men would believe to the contrary. The fact that the
Supreme Court reversed these decisions would tend to indicate that the Court adopted a
narrower test of what censorship was proper. However, this reversal is not conclusive as to
the test applied because the reversal may have resulted just from a different interpretation
of the facts.

